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Resumo
O risco de contágio é a possibilidade de que a falência de uma instituição financeira afetada por algum 
choque exógeno gere a falência de outras instituições não afetadas pelo choque inicialmente. Como sa-
lienta Upper e Worms (2002) e outros, o efeito dominó no sistema de pagamentos depende do padrão 
das interligações bancárias. Este artigo estuda a ocorrência de contágio financeiro após a falência exógena 
de uma instituição autorizada a operar no mercado interbancário de câmbio no Brasil. Os dados contêm 
informações sobre todas as transações efetivamente realizadas no período 01/08/2000 a 31/10/2002. A 
metodologia adotada mostra a ocorrência da propagação do contágio após várias rodadas subseqüentes 
à falência inicial. O artigo quantifica o número de instituições que quebrariam e as perdas financeiras 
do mercado. Existe um aumento substancial no número de falências durante o período pré-eleitoral em 
2002.
PalavRas-chave
contágio, risco sistêmico, mercado interbancário câmbio, Brasil
abstRact
The risk of contagion is the possibility that the failure of a financial institution affected by an exogenous 
shock generates the failure of other institutions not initially affected by the shock. As pointed out by 
Upper and Worms (2002) and others, the domino effect in the payment system depends on the precise 
pattern of interbank linkages. This paper studies the occurrence of financial contagion after the exogenous 
failure of an institution authorized to operate in the Brazilian interbank currency market. The data con-
tain information about all the actual transactions that occurred in this market from August 1st, 2000 to 
October 31st, 2002. The adopted methodology shows the occurrence of contagion propagation in several 
subsequent rounds after the initial failure. We quantify the number of institutions that breakdown and 
the financial losses of the market. There is a large increase in the number of failed institutions during the 
period of the presidential elections in 2002.
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IntRoDuctIon
Systemic risk can be generated either by contagion, in the payment system, or by runs 
on banks, in the banking sector. In the payment system, systemic risk refers to the 
impact that an insolvent bank can have on the banking system. It may cause other 
banks to file for bankruptcy depending on their transactions with the insolvent bank. 
In the banking sector, bank runs usually happen as a response to uncertainty about 
the liquidity of the banks. The first formalized model about bank runs (Diamond 
and Dybvig, 1983) proposed contracts to prevent them. This analysis was extended by 
Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988), who differentiate the runs caused by panic and those 
associated with information. In recent years, several models of bank contagion have 
been developed, among them Rochet and Tirole (1996), Flannery (1996), Huang and 
Xu (2000), Allen and Gale (2000) and Peñaloza (2002).
In Brazil, concern about the risk of contagion in the payment system motivated the 
reformulation of the Brazilian Payment System (SPB), on April 22, 2002. It increased 
the number of Clearing Houses with the purpose of stratifying the operations and re-
ducing systemic risk. We will focus our analysis on the currency exchange transactions 
that are supervised by one of the Clearing Houses (BMF – câmbio). The new system 
reduced risk, by generating guarantees and adopting the payment versus payment 
(PVP) protocol, but it also elevated the costs of operations. It is important to note 
that transactions are not required to be realized within the Clearing House and that 
only 40% of them were in July 2002. The transactions within the BMF-câmbio are 
only susceptible to a controlled and quite small risk. Therefore, we will only consider 
the transactions realized outside of the Clearing House.
Our data is unique.1 Instead of relying on estimates of the bilateral exposures we work 
with the actual transactions of all Brazilian banks authorized to operate in the ex-
change market. We collected daily data from August 1st, 2000 to October 31st, 2002 
on all buying and selling contracts in foreign currency realized by all the institutions 
authorized to operate in this market. We also have daily data on the portfolios of 
federal public bonds held by these institutions during the same period.
The purpose of this paper is to empirically calculate the dimension of the contagion 
effect in the interbank currency exchange market in Brazil. This is accomplished by 
counting the number of banks that breakdown as a consequence of an initial exog-
enous failure. We also estimate how much the Brazilian Central Bank would spend 
if it decided to save the bankrupt banks. The largest number of bankruptcies (banks 
affected by the contagion effect) occurred during the period of the presidential elec-
1 The data was made available by the Department of Foreign Capital and Exchange of the Central Bank 
of Brazil. 
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tions, when a little more than half of the transactions were realized outside of the 
Clearing House.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents the background. Section 2 
discusses the data and the methodology. Section 3 shows the results and last section 
concludes.
1.  BacKGRounD
Both applied and theoretical research in economics has shown that the “domino 
effect” in the payment system depends on the pattern of the interbank linkages. Allen 
and Gale (2000) develop a model based on Diamond and Dybvig (1983), which divi-
des the banks in regions, not necessarily geographical, and show that in a market with 
complete structure (a high level of connections, see Figure 1) there is no contagion 
effect. On the other hand, in a market with incomplete structure (see Figure 2) there 
exists a contagion effect.
FIGuRE 1 – coMPlEtE MaRKEt stRuctuRE
Most articles that estimate the risk of contagion in interbank markets do not use the 
actual structure of bilateral exposures in these markets, since this data is typically 
not publicly available. One exception is Furfine (1999), who uses settlement data on 
bank liquidations to compute bilateral exposures in the U.S. interbank federal funds 
market.
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FIGuRE 2 – IncoMPlEtE MaRKEt stRuctuRE
Sheldon and Maurer (1998) estimate the contagion effect in Switzerland using a 
matrix of interbank loans between 1987 and 1995. They do not consider the deri-
vative markets or currency data. Their results show that the risk of contagion in the 
Swiss bank system is small and it may occur only if one of the four largest banks in 
Switzerland breakdown. In this case the effects are very severe and only a few banks 
would survive these shocks.
Upper and Worms (2002) make use of bank balance sheet data to estimate a matrix 
of bilateral credit relationships. They consider more than 3000 German banks in 
December 1998, classified into maturity categories. They cannot observe the actual 
bilateral exposures, but they estimate them based on the sum of each bank’s interbank 
loans and deposits and a hypothesis of independence. Under these assumptions, if 
a bank is both lender and borrower its element on the main diagonal of the matrix 
is non-zero (implying that the bank was a lender to itself). Therefore, they use an 
algorithm to redistribute the mass of these diagonal elements. They estimate the pos-
sibility of contagion by bankrupting each bank and counting how many other banks 
fail because of their exposure to the exogenously failed bank. A bank has no risk of 
contagion unless it owes more than its capital. One bank’s failure,2 no matter how 
small, can trigger other more significant failures, the “domino effect”.
2.  Data anD MEtHoDoloGY
Our main goal is to investigate the existence, and measure the dimension, of conta-
gion in the interbank currency exchange market in Brazil. We follow the methodology 
of Upper and Worms (2002), but, instead of relying on estimates of the bilateral ex-
2 In this article, the term failure is used when a bank does not have a sufficient amount of liquid resources 
(government bonds) to cover its obligations on any given day. However, the bank may still possess other 
less liquid resources.
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posures, we work with the actual daily transactions of all Brazilian banks authorized 
to operate in the exchange market, between August 1st, 2000 and October 31st, 2002. 
In this sense, we do not have to make assumptions about how to distribute the prob-
ability mass of the banks that are both lenders and borrowers. The database does not 
violate the Privacy Law of the Brazilian banking system, because even though the 
transactions are identifiable the banks involved are not.
The institutions in the market make many currency contracts on a reference day (D 
+ 0). However, most of the contract’s liquidation only happens in two days (D + 
2). If one of the banks breaks on D + 0 or D + 1, the Central Bank may cancel its 
contracts. If a transaction is canceled on D + 0 or D + 1 the only risk incurred by 
the participants still operating is the one associated with currency fluctuation. If the 
breakdown happens on D + 2, the contract is not cancelled and the participants incur 
both default risk and currency fluctuation risk.
When the currency contract is liquidated (D + 2) the buyer of foreign currency is 
debited the value in $Reais at 6 a.m., Brasilia time. In response, the seller of foreign 
currency authorizes the deposit of $Dollars in the buyer’s account abroad. However, 
because of time zone differences, these deposits are made in the afternoon, Brasilia 
time. If the buyer fails on D + 2, its assets are seized and administered by a third 
party. On the other hand, if the seller fails on D + 2 he would have received the 
domestic currency before making the transfer of the foreign currency. Because the 
transfers are not made simultaneously (payment versus payment – PVP) there is both 
a default risk and a currency fluctuation risk associated with these transactions. 
If a transaction is made under the rules of the exchange Clearing House of the SPB, 
currency fluctuation is the only possible risk involved, since they use the payment versus 
payment protocol. Both parties have to deposit a guarantee of payment at the Clearing 
House and if one of them fails on the liquidation date, the other receives its own deposit 
plus the guarantee of the counterpart, valued in the currency of interest of the bank that 
does not go bankrupt, which may not value the same in foreign currency. 
The loss of principal and the losses from currency fluctuations could cause a liquidity 
problem for the buyer. The solution would be a standby facility operation with the 
Central Bank. The buyer institution would receive a credit in its account and it would 
give to the Central Bank (repo operation) government public bonds of high liquidity 
for more than the market rate. If the referred bank (the buyer) does not own govern-
ment bonds of high liquidity, the standby facility operation cannot be made, and it 
is not possible for the bank to obtain the foreign currency needed. In this case, the 
buyer could also go bankrupt, and it could cause the breakdown of a third institution 
in subsequent rounds.
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To model this situation, we generate a matrix L for each day of our sample, where L 
has dimension n x n and n is 114 (the number of banks authorized to operate in the 
exchange market). The elements in L represent all the transactions between the pairs 
of banks that are scheduled to be liquidated that day. Each element ai,j of the matrix 
L represents the amount of foreign currency in $Reais that bank i bought from bank 
j on that day. Therefore, the element aj,i represents the value in $Reais of the foreign 
currency bank j bought from bank i. We assume that { } 0	,114,,1, , ≥∈∀ jiaji  and that
0	, =∀ i,iai . The matrix L can be represented as follows: 
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Define Ci as a row vector with the values of foreign currency purchased by bank i 
from all other banks j on a given day. The sum of all the elements of Ci, denoted by 
iC , represents the maximum loss for bank i, if all the banks with which bank i negoti-
ate go bankrupt on that day. Similarly, define Vj as a column vector whose elements 
are the total value of foreign currency sold by bank j to all other banks i on a given 
day. The sum of all the elements of Vj, denoted by jV , represents the maximum loss 
that bank j can cause to the market if it goes bankrupt on that day.
If a bank is having difficulties honoring its contracts, it may have to liquidate part of 
its assets. However, not all assets have sufficient liquidity to avoid bankruptcy and the 
contagion effect. Government public bonds, bank reserves, stocks, and private bonds 
would have the desirable liquidity. However, the money from stock sales would only 
be available three days after the transaction day (D + 3), making it useless to pay 
for currency contracts. A similar argument holds for private bond portfolios.3 The 
use of bank reserves would only postpone the liquidity problem for 15 days, given 
that this is the time period used when calculating compulsory reserve averages. In 
some cases the institution would have to propose a restructuring plan, as discussed 
in footnote 3.
3 These portfolios could be taken to the Brazilian Central Bank as a guarantee for a loan to liquidate 
the referred currency contract. Moreover, a commercial bank would have to propose a restructuring 
plan to normalize its liquidity according to Resolution n.2.949 of the National Monetary Council, and 
Circular n.3.105 and Circular-Letter n. 3.009 of the Brazilian Central Bank.. 
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Given that only government public bond portfolios4 have daily liquidity, we assume 
that only they are used to pay for currency exchange contracts if the bank does not 
have enough national or foreign currency to liquidate them. We collected daily data 
on the federal public bond portfolios held by all the Brazilian banks authorized to 
operate in the currency exchange market, between August 1st, 2000 and October 
31st, 2002. 
Based on these portfolios we generate daily column vectors GPB (government public 
bonds) with dimension n by 1, where n is 114, the number of banks in the mar-
ket. The vector elements represent the nominal value in $Reais of the public bond 
portfolio of each bank. Initially, we exogenously fail5 each of the participant banks. 
When bank i is broken, all its transactions as a buyer remain unchanged, but it will 
not fulfill its obligations to pay the other banks as a seller of foreign currency. As a 
failed seller, bank i receives $Reais but it does not send the $Dollars. Therefore, bank 
j does not receive any money from bank i to liquidate its transactions and, therefore, 
.		,0, ja ij ∀=  
In this case, Vi would be a column vector of zeros and the L matrix would generate 
the following first round matrix L1:
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Based on L1, we create an intermediary matrix T1 associated with the first round to 
quantify the losses incurred by each of the institutions j on that day as a consequence 
of the exogenous failure of bank i. We have L1LT1 −= 1. An element aj,i of matrix T1 
4 To collect data on the federal public bond portfolios of the studied banks, we take into account the 
value, in national currency ($Reais), of those portfolios at the end of the day (values based on the 
unitary price). We only consider accounts with tradable bonds, and we ignore accounts associated with 
judicial processes, FAT, FGTS, and other blocked accounts.
5 We call an exogenous failure a default that is not generated by the currency exchange market. It could 
be that a big loss occurs in the derivative market, but the bank also has interbank currency operations 
and it is not able to liquidate them because of what happened in the other market.
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informs how much bank i will not pay bank j.6 A second intermediary matrix, also 
associated with the first round, is 1T with dimension n by 1. It contains information 
on the values not received by each institution up to that moment as a consequence of 
the exogenously failed institution. 
With matrices GPB and 1T , we can determine how many banks breakdown in the 
first round because of the exposure to the exogenous failure of bank i. We make use 
of a column vector Q1 1TGPB1 −= , where ),,,,,( 1,1,1,21,1 ni cccc =Q1' . A bank z is con-
sidered bankrupt if cz,1 < 0, for z ≠ i (the exogenously failed bank). If this occurs we 
start second round calculations. In the second round we generate a matrix L2 based 
on L1 by setting the elements  j∀= 	,0zj,a . We repeat the algorithm for the second 
round, creating a matrix L2LT2 −=  L2, which determines the values not received by 
each institution j in the first two rounds.
In general, we build a matrix L(x), of dimension n by n, with a number of zero colu-
mns equal to the number of banks bankrupt from round 1 to round (x–1). A matrix 
L(x)LTx −=  contains the values of the transactions not received from each broken 
bank from the 1st to the xth round. The sum of all non-received values by each ins-
titution is shown in xT .7 The “bankrupt matrix” Q(x) = GPB - xT , indicates the 
number of bankrupt banks after the xth round. If there exists an element of Q(x), cj, x, 
such that cj, x < 0, for j ≠ y where y are the institutions that went bankrupt between 
rounds 1 and (x-1), we should go on to round (x+1).
With this design it is possible to count the number of institutions that may go 
bankrupt because of the exogenous failure of a given bank. We can also calculate the 
value of the non-liquidated operations up to a specific moment. This is how much 
the Central Bank would have to spend to avoid the propagation of bankruptcies (the 
contagion effect). 
3.  REsults
We exogenously fail an institution and we calculate all the rounds necessary for the 
contagion propagation to cease. We then count the number of bankrupt institutions 
excluding the initial breakdown (see Table 1). The procedure is repeated 114 times 
(number of banks operating in the market) for each of the 559 days between August 
1st, 2000 and October 31st, 2002, excluding weekends and holidays. 
6 The superscript indicates the round number that we are calculating.
7 The matrix XT  represents the sum of how much each institution does not receive from all other institu-
tions that fail before round x, while matrix iV  represents how much institution i sells on a given day.
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Table 1 shows that in 490 out of 559 days only one or two banks go bankrupt as a 
consequence of the initial breakdown. However, for five days there were six bankrupt-
cies and for two days seven institutions were contaminated by the exogenous breakdo-
wn. For most of the days between the second semester of 2001 and the first semester 
of 2002, just one bank went bankrupt because of an initial failure (Figure 3). During 
this period, there were only 14 days for which the number of bankruptcies generated 
was greater than 1. The largest variations in the number of bankrupt institutions 
occurred during the second semesters of 2000 and 2002 (Figure 3). 
taBlE 1 – FREQuEncIEs oF M aXIMuM nuMBER oF BanKRuPt 
InstItutIons BY DaY
Number of  Bankruptcies Number of  Days
0 4
1 312
2 178
3 35
4 16
5 7
6 5
7 2
The increased variation in the second semester of 2002 is related to the uncertain-
ty before the presidential elections, with a labor party candidate leading the polls. 
Many agents used foreign currency as a hedge against the risk of government default. 
Another important fact was the exchange rate passing the barrier of R$/US$ 3.00 
which happened in the last week of July 2002 generating unbridled speculation.
FIGuR E 3 – M aXIMuM anD avER aGE nuMBER oF BanK RuPt 
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taBlE 2 – soME cRItIcal DaYs In tHE PERIoD 
Date
Number of Banks Values 
(R$ millions)
Values
(US$ millions)
 Gross  Volume
(US$ billions)
Average Maximum Average Maximum Average Maximum Total
05/09/2000 1,42 4 114,42 1.210,69 62,57 662,09 4.78
28/03/2001 2,37 5 26,21 138,40 12,39 65,40 3.44
02/07/2001 1,88 5 28,13 197,78 12,10 85,10 1.98
12/07/2001 1,45 3 31,20 260,25 12,28 102,40 2.21
01/07/2002 1,00 1 191,90 949,09 67,13 332,00 1.80
13/08/2002 1,11 2 114,08 879,16 35,56 274,00 1.08
19/08/2002 2,82 5 223,93 287,99 71,92 92,50 0.61
26/09/2002 1,50 2 96,40 503,42 25,70 134,22 0.94
25/10/2002 5,74 7 172,41 315,46 45,36 83,00 1.07
28/10/2002 5,10 7 205,42 326,48 54,93 87,30 1.30
Note: The maximums are in boldface. 
One would expect that after the implantation of the Brazilian System of Payment 
(SPB), on April 22, 2002, there would be a reduction in the recursive breakdowns. 
Even though the agents are not obliged to operate inside the Clearing House, during 
August 2002 more than half of the transactions were made in this environment. 
Despite this, the highest average number of bankruptcies happened during October 
2002. On the Friday just before the presidential elections (Sunday, October 27th 
2002) an average of 5.74 and a maximum of 7 institutions went bankrupt, besides 
the exogenous failure. On the Monday just after the presidential elections, the maxi-
mum number of bankruptcies was also 7, but the average fell to 5.1 institutions. The 
average of the maximum number of breakdowns was a little above 5.5 for the second 
half of October 2002.
FIGuRE 4 – avERaGE nuMBER oF BanKRuPt BanKs anD MaXIMuM 
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The failure of an institution generates contagion in the system and hence some opera-
tions are not liquidated. This leads us to the dilemma of the Central Bank, which has 
to choose between canceling the non-liquidated operations (this may cause systemic 
risk) and liquidating the operations with its own resources. The second choice may 
lead to a moral hazard problem. If the Central Bank had decided to liquidate the 
operations with its own resources in our setup, the maximum loss incurred would be 
around R$1.21 billion (corresponding to US$662 million) on September 5th, 2000 
(Table 2), representing 14% of the total amount of transactions in the exchange ma-
rket on that day.8 On October 25th and October 28th of 2002 (the day before and after 
the presidential elections) these losses would be R$315 million (US$83 million) and 
R$326 million (US$87.3 million) respectively. Two other peaks of maximum losses 
occurred on July 1st, 2002 (R$ 949 million; US$ 332 million) and on August 13th, 
2002 (R$ 879 million; US$ 274 million). The second date was the start of a period of 
intensified speculation about the presidential elections (the pattern is similar in both 
$Reais and in $Dollars). Figure 4 and Table 2 illustrate these results.
conclusIon
We have shown that the Brazilian interbank currency market can generate great losses 
to the banking system with the exogenous failure of an institution. We observe that 
the largest number of institutions were affected by contagion around the presidential 
elections. There seems to exist a high correlation between the political moment and 
currency contagion, a fact that will be explored in future work.
The largest number of bankrupt institutions by contagion occurred after the implanta-
tion of the Brazilian System of Payment (SPB), when only 40% of the operations were 
realized outside the Currency Clearing House. If the SPB had not been implemented 
the results may have been worse.
It is important to point out that Circular n. 3.105 of the Central Bank of Brazil au-
thorizes the banks to use public bonds that are allocated in repurchase agreement 
operations in order to increase market liquidity. Without this mechanism, contagion 
would be a substantial problem, as shown by our simulations.
Given that the breakdown of an institution at the most critical time of the analysis 
(October 2002) could bring seven other institutions to bankruptcy, and that the ma-
ximum amount of resources necessary to abort a contagion was above R$ 1.2 billion 
on September 5, 2000, it is important to create a mechanism to reduce the possible 
8 The total gross volume of transactions in the exchange market on September 5th of 2000 was US$ 4.78 
billions.
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number of bankruptcies and losses. The Brazilian Central Bank should create incen-
tives to induce banks to perform all their operations within the Currency Clearing 
House. This solution could be, in principle, more expensive for the institutions, but 
there would be a better monitoring of the agents by the principals and a better control 
of risk. A possible way of doing this would be requiring an increased portfolio of go-
vernment public bonds for the institutions that operate outside of the Clearing House. 
This could make the banks decide to use the Clearing House for all its operations.
Similar calculations of contagion, using all the transactions in the market and all the 
Clearing Houses, would be an important future work in this area.
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